This paper proves the tight sample complexity of Second-Price Auction with Anonymous Reserve, up to a logarithmic factor, for all value distribution families that have been considered in the literature. Compared to Myerson Auction, whose sample complexity was settled very recently in (Guo, Huang and Zhang, STOC 2019), Anonymous Reserve requires much fewer samples for learning. We follow a similar framework as the Guo-Huang-Zhang work, but replace their information theoretical argument with a direct proof.
The first "approximability" result was attained in Myerson's original paper [Mye81] : if the value distributions are i.i.d. and meet the standard regularity assumption (see Section 2.1 for its definition), Myerson Auction reduces to Anonymous Reserve auction. Even though the distributional assumptions are greatly relaxed, as we quote from Hartline and Roughgarden [HR09] : "in quite general settings, simple auctions like Anonymous Reserve auction provably approximates the optimal expected revenue, to within a small constant factor." Also, the learnability has been tackled in various contexts. E.g., Cesa-Bianchi et al. [CGM15] assumed i.i.d. and [0, 1]-support value distributions, and got a nearly optimal sample complexity of Θ(ε −2 ). 2 Despite the above discussions, how many samples suffice to learn an (1 − ε)-approximately optimal reserve price, when the bidders may have distinct value distributions? This problem is important to understand the Anonymous Reserve auction but has yet to be settled. Because we only need to learn a good reserve price, conceivably the task should be much easier than learning Myerson Auction, which requires full understanding of all bidders' distributions. Our work shows that this is exactly the case: as Table 1 illustrates, Anonymous Reserve auction in comparison has dramatically smaller sample complexity. Remarkably, it depends only on the precision ε ∈ (0, 1) but not on the population n ∈ N ≥1 .
Theorem 1, cf. [CGM15, MR15, MM16, RS16] Table 1 : Comparison between the sample complexity of Myerson Auction and that of Anonymous Reserve. In the MHR setting, the matching lower bounds of Ω(n · ε −2 ) and Ω(ε −2 ) are known for the discrete MHR distributions [GHZ19, Section 4 & Appendix D.1]. If we insist on the continuous MHR distributions, the best known lower bounds are Ω(n · ε −3/2 ) [GHZ19, Appendix E] and Ω(ε −3/2 ) [HMR18, Section 4].
In fact, our learning algorithm for the Anonymous Reserve auction is very simple and intuitive, and thus may be more attractive in practice. First, we slightly "shrink" (in the sense of stochastic dominance) the empirical distributions determined by the samples, leading to the dominated empirical distributions. Then, we compute the optimal reserve price for these dominated empirical distributions (or anyone of the optimal reserve prices when there are multiple ones). Employing this reserve price turns out to generate an (1 − ε)-fraction as much revenue as the optimal Anonymous Reserve auction.
This framework was proposed by Guo et al. [GHZ19] and the analysis contains two parts: revenue monotonicity and revenue smoothness. The revenue monotonicity of a certain auction means, if a distribution instance F stochastically dominates another F ′ , then the respective revenues satisfy REV(F) ≥ REV(F ′ ). Since Myerson Auction and the Anonymous Reserve auction both have this feature, for the analysis about revenue monotonicity we can apply arguments similar to [GHZ19] . Further, the revenue smoothness means that if two distribution instances are stochastically close (in some metric), then the revenues from them must be close as well. In [GHZ19] , the revenue smoothness of Myerson Auction is established on an elegant information theoretical argument. However, this proof scheme is inapplicable here, and instead we will present a more direct proof.
Before elaborating on the new argument, let us briefly explain why the Anonymous Reserve auction needs much fewer samples. The outcome of such an auction (namely the allocation and the payment) is controlled by the highest and second-highest bids. Accordingly, the optimal reserve price can be derived just from the distributions of these two bids. (In contrast, we must know the distributions of all bidders, in order to implement Myerson Auction.) Since only two distributions rather than n distributions are involved, we can eliminate the dependence of the sample complexity on the population.
Nonetheless, the restriction on the highest and second-highest bids incurs another issue. In the model, we assume the bids to be mutually independent. This assumption is critical both for the information theoretical argument in [GHZ19] and for the optimality of Myerson Auction. On the opposite, the highest two bids in general are correlated. It is highly non-trivial whether we can extend the information theoretical argument to accommodate the correlated distributions. 3 Thus, we prove the revenue smoothness by working with the Anonymous Reserve revenue directly. The techniques derived here may find extra applications in the future (e.g. they complement the extreme value theorems in [CR14, CD15, MR15] ). We believe that a similar approach (associated with the tools in [JLQ + 19]) can circumvent the information theoretical argument in [GHZ19] and refine the poly-logarithmic factors in their sample complexity of Myerson Auction.
Correlation. Another benefit of the direct argument is that, even if all the n bids are arbitrarily correlated (but capped with a certain high value), learning the Anonymous Reserve auction requires exactly the same amount of samples. This generalized model is arguably much more realistic. An intriguing open problem in this direction is to study, with respect to the correlated distributions, the sample complexity of the optimal mechanisms [DFK15, PP15] or the optima in certain families of robust mechanisms [Ron01, CHLW11, BGLT19].
Data Compression.
If we care about the space complexity of the learning algorithms, the improvement on the Anonymous Reserve auction against Myerson Auction is even larger. To learn Myerson Auction, we need O(n 2 ) · poly(1/ε) space both to implement the algorithm and to store the output auction. (Note that each sample is an n-dimensional value vector.) I.e., we cannot predict the bids coming in the future, and must record all details of the learned virtual value functions. But for the Anonymous Reserve auction, in that only the highest and second-highest bids are involved, we just need poly(1/ε) space to implement the algorithm and O(1) space to store the learned reserve price.
Comparison with Previous Approaches
To understand the sample complexity of Anonymous Reserve auction, an immediate attempt is to readopt the algorithm of Cesa-Bianchi et al. [CGM15] , under minor modification to accommodate non-identical and even correlated value distributions (rather than just the i.i.d. ones). However, that algorithm crucially relies on a particular property of i.i.d. value distributions: we can infer F 1 point-wise from F 2 and vice versa, where F i denotes the CDF of the i-th highest bid. Without the i.i.d. assumption, the correlation between F 1 and F 2 is much more complex, which makes this attempt fail to work for our purpose.
Also, one may attempt the empirical revenue maximization scheme, which gives the nearly tight sample complexity for the similar task "optimal pricing for a single bidder". Unfortunately, in the regular and the MHR settings, the proofs of that sample complexity [DRY10, HMR18] crucially rely on the respective regularity/MHR assumption. In contrast, given n ∈ N ≥1 many regular/MHR value distributions, F 1 and F 2 may be Θ(n)-modal [JLTX19, Example 2]. Thus, F 1 and F 2 themselves cannot be regular/MHR (recall that a regular/MHR distribution must be unimodal). To conclude, this attempt fails to work as well.
Another approach in the literature is to construct an ε-net of all candidate reserve prices, namely a careful poly(1/ε)-size hypothesis set H, and figure out the best one in H through the samples (cf. [DHP16, RS16, GN17] , which use this method to learn Myerson Auction). In fact, for the [0, 1]-support and the [1, H]-support settings, it is a folklore that ε-net type algorithms can achieve the almost tight sample complexity. But the regular and the MHR cases are less understood, mainly due to the lack of suitable tools such as some particular extreme value theorems. This is settled here; given the developed techniques, we can present such sampleoptimal ε-net type algorithms in both settings.
However, we prefer the "shrink-then-optimize" framework of Guo et al. [GHZ19] for two reasons. First, for different value distribution families, ε-net type algorithms must pick distinct hypothesis sets H, whereas the new framework gives a unified and robust learning algorithm. Second, our paper illustrates that the new framework works not only for the input value distributions (cf. [GHZ19] ) but also for some "sketched" distributions, i.e. order statistics for our purpose. It would be interesting to see further extensions of this framework.
Other Related Work
As mentioned, after being proposed in the pioneering work of Cole and Roughgarden [CR14] , the sample complexity of Myerson Auction had been improved in a sequence of papers [MR15, DHP16, RS16, GN17, Syr17] and was eventually resolved by Guo et al. [GHZ19] . En route, a number of techniques have been developed, which may find their applications in mechanism design, learning theory and information theory. For an outline of these techniques, the reader can turn to [GHZ19, Section 1].
A very related topic is the sample complexity of single-bidder revenue maximization. Now, the optimal mechanism is to post the monopoly price p
and then let the bidder make a take-it-or-leave-it decision. Again, the problem is self-contained only under one of the four assumptions in Table 1 . Up to a poly-logarithmic factor, the optimal sample complexity is Θ(ε −2 ) in the [0, 1]-support additive-error setting [BBHM08, HMR18], Θ(H · ε −2 ) in the [1, H]-support setting [BBHM08, HMR18], Θ(ε −3 ) in the continuous regular setting [DRY10, HMR18] , and Θ(ε −2 ) in the MHR setting [GHZ19] .
One can easily see that, 4 in each of the four settings, the sample complexity of the Anonymous Reserve auction must be lower bounded by the single-bidder sample complexity. In that each mentioned single-bidder lower bound matches with the claimed sample complexity of the Anonymous Reserve auction in Table 1 (up to a logarithmic factor), it remains to establish the upper bounds in the bulk of this work.
To learn good posted prices for a single buyer, a complementary direction is to investigate how much expected revenue can be achieved via exactly one sample. When the distribution is regular, Dhangwatnotai et al. [DRY10] showed that using the sampled value itself as the price guarantees half of the optimal revenue. Indeed, this ratio is the best possible (in the worst-case-analysis sense), when the seller must post a deterministic price. But, better ratios are possible under certain adjustments to the model. First, if the seller can observe one more sample, he can improve the ratio to 0.509 [BGMM18] . 5 Second, if a randomized price is allowed, the seller can get a better revenue guarantee by constructing a careful distribution of the price from the single sample [FILS15] . Recently, Allouah and Besbes [AB19] improved this ratio to 0.501, and proved no randomized pricing scheme can achieve a 0.511-approximation.
Further, if the buyer's distribution satisfies the stronger MHR condition, Huang et al. [HMR18] gave a deterministic 0.589-approximation one-sample pricing scheme. Afterwards, Allouah and Besbes [AB19] improved this ratio to 0.635, and obtained a 0.648 impossibility result for any deterministic/randomized pricing scheme.
Another motivation of the "mechanism design via sampling" program is the recent research interest in multi-item mechanism design, where Myerson Auction or its naive generalizations are no longer optimal. In fact, the optimal multi-item mechanisms are often computationally and conceptually hard [DDT14, CDO + 15, CDP + 18, CMPY18]. To escape from this dilemma, there is a rich literature on proving that various simple multi-item mechanisms are learnable from polynomial samples and constantly approximate the optimal revenues [MR15, BSV16, DS16, MR16, CD17, Syr17, BSV18].
Notation and Preliminaries
Notation. Denote by R ≥0 (resp. N ≥1 ) the set of all non-negative real numbers (resp. positive integers). For any pair of integers b ≥ a ≥ 0, denote by [a] the set {1, 2, · · · , a}, and by [a : b] the set {a, a + 1, · · · , b}. Denote by ½{·} the indicator function. The function (·) + maps any real number z ∈ R to max{0, z}. For convenience, we interchange bid/value and bidder/buyer.
Probability
Throughout the paper, we always use the calligraphic letter F to denote the input instance (i.e. an n-dimensional joint distribution), from which the n buyers together sample/draw a random value vector s ≡ (s j ) j∈[n] ∈ R n ≥0 . Particularly, if the value s j 's are independent random variables (sampled/drawn from a product distribution F), we further write F ≡ {F j } n j=1 , where each F j presents the the marginal value distribution of the individual buyer j ∈ [n].
Actually, with respect to the Anonymous Reserve auctions (to be elaborated in Section 2.2), the highest and second-highest values s 1 and s 2 are of particular interest. We respectively denote by F 1 and F 2 the distributions of s 1 and s 2 .
As usual in literature, we also use the notations F and F i (for i ∈ {1, 2}) and F j (for j ∈ [n]) to denote the corresponding CDF's. However, we assume that a single-dimensional CDF F i or F j is left-continuous, 6 in the sense that if a buyer has a random value s ∼ F for a price-p item, then his unwilling-to-purchase probability is Pr{s < p} rather than Pr{s ≤ p}. Additionally, we say that a distribution F stochastically dominates another distribution F ′ (or simply F F ′ ) when their CDF's have F(v) ≤ F ′ (v) for any value v ∈ R ≥0 .
We will probe the input instance F in four canonical settings. The first and second settings, where the support supp(F) is bounded within the n-dimensional hypercube [0, 1] n or [1, H] n (for a given real number H ≥ 1), are clear.
The third setting requires the input instance F ≡ {F j } n j=1 to be a product distribution, and each F j to be a continuous regular distribution. 7 Denote by f j the corresponding PDF. According to [Mye81] , the regularity means that the virtual value function ϕ j (v)
is nondecreasing on the support of supp(F j ).
In the last setting, the input instance F ≡ {F j } n j=1 also must be a product distribution, but each F j now may be a discrete or continuous (or even mixture) distribution that has a monotone hazard rate (MHR). Let us specify the MHR condition (cf. [BMP63] ) in the next paragraph.
MHR Distribution.
Any discrete MHR instance F ≡ {F j } n j=1 must be supported on a discrete set {k · ∆ | k ∈ N ≥1 } (as Figure 1 (a) demonstrates), where ∆ > 0 is a given step-size. For each j ∈ [n], consider the step function G j (v) def = ln 1 − F j (v) (marked in blue) as well as the piecewise linear function L j (marked in gray) determined by the origin (0, 0) and the " "-type points k·∆, G j (k·∆) 's (marked in green). The MHR condition holds iff each L j is a concave function. Moreover, for a continuous MHR instance F ≡ {F j } n j=1 , each individual F j is supported on a possibly distinct interval. The MHR condition holds iff each G j (v) def = ln 1 − F j (v) is a concave function on its own support, as Figure 1 
Anonymous Reserve
In a Second-Price Auction with Anonymous Reserve, the seller posts an a priori reserve r ∈ R ≥0 to the item. There are three possible outcomes: (i) when no buyer has a value of at least the reserve r, the auction would abort; (ii) when there is exactly one such buyer, he would pay the reserve r for winning the item; (iii) when there are two or more such buyers, the highest-value buyer (with arbitrary tie-breaking rule) would pay the second-highest value (i.e. a price of at least the reserve r) for winning the item. Now, let us formulate the expected revenue from the above mechanism [CGM15, Fact 1]. Sample a random value vector s ≡ (s j ) j∈[n] ∼ F and then denote by ( s 1 , s 2 ) the highest and second-highest values. By simulating the mechanism, we have
In order to comprehend the expected revenue (denoted by AR(r, F) for brevity), we need to know nothing (e.g. the correlation between s 1 and s 2 ) but the marginal CDF's F 1 and F 2 . Thus, we often write F ≡ F 1 ⊎ F 2 , namely the "union" of the highest and second-highest CDF's. Equipped with the new notations, let us formulate the expected revenue more explicitly.
Fact 1 (Revenue Formula). Under any reserve r ∈ R ≥0 , the corresponding Anonymous Reserve auction extracts an expected revenue of AR(r,
When the reserve r ∈ R ≥0 is selected optimally, namely r F def = argmax{AR(r, F) | r ∈ R ≥0 } (which might be infinity), we simply write AR(F) ≡ AR(r F , F). Based on the revenue formula in Fact 1, one can easily check the next Fact 2 via elementary calculations.
Fact 2. The following holds for any pair of instances F ≡ F 1 ⊎ F 2 and F ′ ≡ F ′ 1 ⊎ F ′ 2 that admits the stochastic dominance F 1 F ′ 1 and F 2 F ′ 2 :
For ease of presentation, we also need the extra notations below, and the next Fact 3 (see Appendix A.1 for its proof) will often be invoked in our later proof.
• The parameter β def = ln(8m/δ) m , in which m ∈ N ≥1 represents the sample complexity and δ ∈ (0, 1) denotes the failing probability of a learning algorithm.
• The empirical instance E ≡ E 1 ⊎ E 2 is given by a number of m ∈ N ≥1 samples. Consider the i-th highest entry of every sample, then the i-th highest empirical distribution E i is exactly the uniform distribution supported on these i-th highest entries. Equivalently, E i is the uniform distribution induced by m samples from the i-th highest input distribution F i .
Respecting Fact 3, all the above instances are well defined. Without ambiguity, we simply
In the next section, we show certain properties of/among them and the input instance F ≡ F 1 ⊎ F 2 .
Empirical Algorithm
In this section, we first present our learning algorithm and formalize our main results (given respectively in Algorithm 1 and Theorem 1). Afterwards, we probe into the learned Anonymous Reserve auction via the revenue monotonicity (cf. Fact 2). As a result, the learning problem will be converted into proving a certain property (parameterized by β = ln(8m/δ) m , where m is the sample complexity) of the concerning instance F ≡ F 1 ⊎ F 2 .
Algorithm 1 Empirical Algorithm
Let E i be the i-th highest empirical CDF induced by the i-th highest sample s i 4:
be the shaded counterpart of the i-th highest empirical CDF E i 5: end for 6: return the optimal reserve r E for E ≡ E 1 ⊎ E 2 (under any tie-breaking rule) Theorem 1. With (1 − δ) confidence, the reserve r E ∈ R ≥0 output by Algorithm 1 gives a nearly optimal Anonymous Reserve revenue AR(r E , F) ≥ AR(F) − ε, conditioned on
Analysis via Revenue Monotonicity. The following Lemma 1 suggests that (with high confidence) the empirical instance E ≡ E 1 ⊎ E 2 is close to the original instance F ≡ F 1 ⊎ F 2 in the Kolmogorov distance. We defer the proof of Lemma 1 to Appendix A.2.
, the following holds for the i-th highest CDF F i and its empirical counterpart E i : for any value v ∈ R ≥0 ,
Compared to the earlier function S E (·), the current function S F (·) distorts the input x ∈ [0, 1] to a greater extent:
where the inequality is strict when S F (x) < 1. Given these and in view of Lemma 1 (that the empirical instance E is close to the original instance F), the two shaded instances E and F are likely to admit the dominance E i F i for both i ∈ {1, 2}.
The above two propositions are formalized as Lemma 2 (see Appendix A.3 for its proof):
Lemma 2. In the case of Lemma 1, which happens with (1 − δ) confidence, for both i ∈ {1, 2}, the following holds for the empirical i-th highest CDF E i :
Using the reserve r E output by Algorithm 1, the corresponding Anonymous Reserve auction extracts an expected revenue of AR(r E , F) from the original instance F ≡ F 1 ⊎ F 2 . Below, Lemma 3 gives a lower bound of this revenue, which is more convenient for our later analysis.
Lemma 3. In the case of Lemma 1, which happens with (1 − δ) confidence, from the original instance F ≡ F 1 ⊎ F 2 , the Anonymous Reserve with a reserve of r E generates a revenue better than the optimal Anonymous Reserve revenue from the shaded instance F ≡ F 1 ⊎ F 2 :
Proof of Lemma 3. Due to Lemma 2 and Fact 2 (i.e. the revenue monotonicity with respect to Anonymous Reserve):
This completes the proof of Lemma 3.
Remarkably, the lower-bound revenue AR( F ) is irrelevant to Algorithm 1, since we directly construct the shaded instance F ≡ F 1 ⊎ F 2 from the original instance F via the function S F (·) (parameterized by β = ln(8m/δ) m , where m is the promised sample complexity). Based on the above discussions, Theorem 1 immediately follows if we have
Both inequalities will be justified in the next section.
Revenue Smoothness
In this section, we will bound the additive or multiplicative revenue gap between the shaded instance F ≡ F 1 ⊎ F 2 and the original instance F ≡ F 1 ⊎ F 2 . First of all, one can easily check the next Fact 4 via elementary calculations.
Fact 4. The following holds for the parameter β
[0, 1] n -Support Setting
Given the sample complexity m = O ε −2 · (ln ε −1 + ln δ −1 ) promised in Theorem 1.1, we safely assume m ≥ 36ε −2 · (ln ε −1 + ln δ −1 + 3). Let us explore the function S F (·): for any x ∈ [0, 1],
denote the optimal reserve for the original instance F = F 1 ⊎ F 2 . Then, we have 8
This concludes the proof in the setting with [0, 1]-bounded support.
[1, H] n -Support Setting
Given the sample complexity m = O ε −2 · H · (ln ε −1 + ln H + ln δ −1 ) promised in Theorem 1.2, we safely assume m ≥ 144ε −2 · H · (ln ε −1 + ln H + ln δ −1 + 4). To see this amount of samples is sufficient to learn a nearly optimal Anonymous Reserve, the next two facts will be useful.
Fact 5. From the original instance F ≡ F 1 ⊎ F 2 , the optimal Anonymous Reserve revenue AR(F) is at least the support infimum of s l = 1.
Proof of Fact 5. Obvious, e.g. the item always gets sold out under a reserve of 1.
Fact 6. For the original instance F ≡ F 1 ⊎ F 2 , there is an optimal Anonymous Reserve auction having a reserve of r F ∈ 1,
Proof of Fact 6. When there are multiple alternative optimal reserves r F 's, we would select the smallest one. Clearly, the bound F −1 1 ( H−1 H ) is at least the support infimum of s l = 1 ≤ F −1 1 (0). Actually, employing the reserve of 1 guarantees as much revenue as employing another reserve r ∈ F −1 1 ( H−1 H ), H : recall the Anonymous Reserve revenue formula,
That is, under our tie-breaking rule, any reserve r ∈ F −1 1 ( H−1 H ), H cannot be optimal, which completes the proof of Fact 5.
Define a parameter
As shown in the former [0, 1]-support setting, the function S F (x) ≤ x + 8β · x · (1 − x) + 7β for any x ∈ [0, 1]. We thus deduce that 9 AR(F) − AR( F ) ≤ AR(r F , F) − AR(r F , F) (r F may not be optimal for F)
where
We measure these terms in the next two lemmas.
Lemma 4. (First Term
Combining the above two inequalities together completes the proof of Lemma 4.
Proof of Lemma 5. Clearly, the second-
This completes the proof of Lemma 5.
Applying Lemmas 4 and 5 to inequality (1), we conclude AR( F ) ≥ (1 − ε) · AR(F) as follows:
(as 
Continuous Regular Setting
Throughout this subsection, we assume that each buyer j ∈ [n] independently draws his value (for the item) from a continuous regular distribution F j . Different from the former two settings, a regular distribution may have an unbounded support, which incurs extra technical challenges in proving the desired sample complexity of Algorithm 1.
To address this issue, we carefully truncate the given instance F, such that (1) the resulting instance F * is still close to F, under the measurement of the optimal Anonymous Reserve revenue; (2) F * has a small enough support supremum, which allows us to bound the revenue gap between it and its shaded counterpart F * (à la the proofs in the former two settings). Indeed, (3) F * is dominated by the shaded instance F (derived directly from F), thus AR( F * ) ≤ AR(F). Combining everything together completes the proof in this setting. Auxiliary Lemmas. To elaborate the truncation scheme, let us introduce several useful facts. Below, Lemma 6 might be known in the literature, yet we give a short proof for completeness. Notably, this lemma only requires the independency among the distributions F ≡ {F j } n j=1 .
Lemma 6 (Order Statistics of Independent Distributions). For any instance F ≡ {F j } n j=1 , the following holds for the highest CDF F 1 and the second-highest CDF F 2 : for any value v ∈ R ≥0 ,
10 Particularly, even if rF ≥ B, we still have (Second Term
Proof of Lemma 6. After elementary calculations (e.g. see [JLTX19, Section 4]), one can easily check that the highest CDF F 1 (v) = n j=1 F j (v) and the second-highest CDF
We thus conclude the proof of Lemma 6 by rearranging the above inequality.
We safely scale the original instance F ≡ {F j } n j=1 so that max v∈R ≥0 v · 1 − F 1 (v) = 1. Together with Lemma 6, this normalization leads to the following observations.
Fact 8. The highest CDF F 1 is stochastically dominated by the equal-revenue CDF
Truncation Scheme. Based on the original instance F ≡ F 1 ⊎ F * 2 , we construct the truncated instance F * ≡ F * 1 ⊎ F * 2 as follows: for both i ∈ {1, 2} and any value v ∈ R ≥0 ,
We immediately get two useful facts about the truncated instance F * ≡ F * 1 ⊎ F * 2 .
Fact 10. For all i ∈ {1, 2}, the truncated i-th highest CDF F * i is dominated by the original i-th highest CDF F i . Thus, the shaded counterpart
Proof of Fact 10. The first dominance F * i F i is obvious (by construction). The second dominance F * i F i also holds, because S F (·) is a non-decreasing function (see Fact 3).
Fact 11. The truncated instance F * ≡ F * 1 ⊎ F * 2 has a support supremum of s u ≤ 4/ε.
Proof of Fact 11. As we certified in Lemma 6, for any value v ∈ R ≥0 , the highest and secondhighest CDF's satisfy that 1 − F 2 (v) ≤ 1 − F 1 (v) 2 . From this one can derive that
For each i-th highest CDF F i , we indeed truncate the particular ( ε 4 ) i -fraction of quantiles that correspond to the largest possible values. In view of the above inequality, the truncated secondhighest CDF F * 2 must have a smaller support supremum than the truncated highest CDF F * 1 . Due to Fact 8, we further have
and thus s u ≤ 4 ε . This completes the proof of Fact 11.
Revenue Loss. The next Lemma 7 shows that (Truncation) only incurs a small revenue loss.
Lemma 7 (Revenue Loss). The truncated instance F * ≡ F * 1 ⊎ F * 2 satisfies that
Proof of Lemma 7. We adopt a hybrid argument. For brevity, let AR(r, F 1 ⊎ F * 2 ) be the resulting Anonymous Reserve revenue (under any reserve r ∈ R ≥0 ) when only the second-highest CDF is truncated, and let r be the optimal reserve for the hybrid instance F 1 ⊎ F * 2 . The lemma comes from these two inequalities:
(3)
In the remainder of the proof, we verify these two inequalities one by one.
[Inequality (2)]. Under replacing the original highest CDF F 1 with F * 1 , we claim that ∃(r ≤ r) :
The new reserve r ∈ [0, r] may not be optimal for the truncated instance F * ≡ F * 1 ⊎ F * 2 . Based on the revenue formula and assuming inequality (⋆), we infer inequality (2) as follows:
(r is optimal for F 1 ⊎ F * 2 ) It remains to verify inequality (⋆). If F 1 (r) < 1 − ε/4, by construction we have F * 1 (v) = F 1 (v) for any value v ≤ r. Clearly, inequality (⋆) holds by employing the same reserve r ← r.
From now on, we safely assume F 1 (r) ≡ n j=1 F j (r) ≥ 1 − ε/4. Inequality (⋆) is enabled by the next Fact 12, which can be summarized from [AHN + 15, Section 2].
Fact 12. For any continuous regular distribution F j and any value r ∈ R ≥0 , define the parameter
Then, F j (v) ≤ v v+a j for any value v ∈ [0, r], with the equality holds when v = r.
Consider another auxiliary highest CDF
In view of Fact 12, it suffices to show the following instead of inequality (⋆):
We choose r ← G * −1
1
(1 − ε/4). Since G * 1 (r) = F 1 (r) ≥ 1 − ε/4 (by Fact 12 and our assumption) and G * 1 is an increasing function, we do have r ≤ r. Let us bound the new reserve r from below:
Given this, we can accomplish inequality (⋄) as follows:
LHS of (⋄) = r · (ε/4) ≥ (1 − ε/4) · n j=1 a j = (1 − ε/4) · r · n j=1 1/F j (r) − 1 (by definition of a j )
where the last inequality is because z i ≥ 1 − (1 − z i ) when z i 's are between [0, 1].
[Inequality (3)]. Since the reserve r F is optimal for the original instance F ≡ F 1 ⊎ F 2 but may not for the hybrid instance F 1 ⊎ F * 2 , we deduce from the revenue formula that
Apply both facts to the RHS of the above inequality:
which becomes inequality (3) after being rearranged. This completes the proof of Lemma 7.
We now certify that, when the sample complexity m ≥ 11520ε −3 · (ln ε −1 + ln δ −1 + 4), the optimal Anonymous Reserve revenue from the shaded truncated instance F * ≡ F * 1 ⊎ F * 2 is indeed close enough to that from the truncated instance F * ≡ F * 1 ⊎ F * 2 .
Lemma 8. The following holds for the shaded truncated instance F * ≡ F * 1 ⊎ F * 2 :
Proof of Lemma 8. Denote by r * the optimal reserve for the truncated instance F * ≡ F * 1 ⊎ F * 2 . Clearly, r * is at most the support supremum of s u ≤ 4/ε (see Fact 11), and may not be optimal for the shaded truncated instance F * ≡ F * 1 ⊎ F * 2 . As illustrated in the former two settings, the function S F (x) ≤ x + 8β · x · (1 − x) + 7β for any x ∈ [0, 1]. Given these, 11 AR(F * ) − AR( F * ) ≤ AR(r * , F * ) − AR(r * , F * ) (r * may not be optimal for F * )
where (First Term) def = r * · 8β · F 1 (r * ) · 1 − F 1 (r * ) .
In the reminder of the proof, we quantify these two terms one by one.
[First Term]. We infer from Facts 8 and 10 that the truncated highest CDF F * 1 (v) ≥ 1 − 1 v for any value v ∈ R ≥0 . Additionally, of course F * 1 (v) ≤ 1. We thus have
(as r * ≤ s u ≤ 4/ε)
[Second Term]. Based on Facts 9 and 10, for any value v ∈ R ≥0 , the truncated second-highest CDF F * 2 (v) ≥ (1 − 1 v 2 ) + . Also, of course F * 2 (v) ≤ 1. For these reasons,
Plug the above two inequalities into inequality (4):
This completes the proof of Lemma 8.
The next Corollary 1 accomplishes the proof in the continuous regular setting.
Corollary 1.
When the sample complexity m ≥ 11520ε −3 · (ln ε −1 + ln δ −1 + 4):
MHR Setting
In this subsection, we also assume that the original distributions F ≡ {F j } n j=1 are independent, and scale the instance such that max v∈R ≥0 v · 1 − F 1 (v) = 1. Hence, Lemma 6 and Facts 7 to 9 still holds. Nevertheless, the lower-bound formulas in Facts 8 and 9 (for the highest and second-highest CDF's) actually have too heavy tails. Namely, sharper formulas are required to prove the desired revenue gap between the original instance F and its shaded counterpart F, given the more demanding sample complexity of m = O ε −2 · (ln ε −1 + ln δ −1 ) .
Based on the particular structures of the MHR distributions, we will first obtain workable lower-bound formulas, and then quantify the revenue loss between AR( F ) and AR(F). To this end, we safely assume m ≥ 5610ε −2 · (ln ε −1 + ln δ −1 + 5).
Lower-Bound CDF Formulas. Below, Lemma 9 shows that the highest and second-highest CDF's of any MHR instance decay exponentially fast.
Lemma 9. The following holds for any continuous or discrete MHR instance F ≡ {F j } n j=1 :
1. The highest CDF F 1 (v) ≥ 1 − 3 2 · e −v/6 for any value v ≥ e.
2.
The second-highest CDF F 2 (v) ≥ 1 − 9 4 · e −v/3 for any value v ≥ e.
3.
The shaded instance F ≡ F 1 ⊎ F 2 has a support supremum of s u ≤ 12 ln( 21 ε ).
Proof of Lemma 9. To see Item 1, we fix a parameter u > 1 (to be determined) and present a reduction (from the original MHR distributions F ≡ {F j } n j=1 to certain continuous exponential distributions) such that, for any value v ≥ u, the highest CDF decreases point-wise. We first investigate the discrete MHR instances. As Figure 2 (a) illustrates and by definition (see Section 2.1), such an instance F ≡ {F j } n j=1 has a discrete support of {k · ∆ | k ∈ N ≥1 }, where the step-size ∆ > 0 is fixed. We must have ∆ ≤ 1, because the instance is scaled so that max v∈R ≥0 v · 1 − F 1 (v) = 1 and ∆ is exactly the support infimum (i.e. F 1 (∆) = 0).
For any j ∈ [n], let us consider the step function G j (v) def = ln 1 − F j (v) (marked in blue in Figure 2(a) ) and the piece-wise linear function L j (marked in gray) induced by the origin (0, 0) and the " "-type points k · ∆, G j (k · ∆) 's (marked in green). Apparently,
The MHR condition holds iff L j is a concave function (see Section 2.1). Choose u ← k · ∆ (for some k ∈ N ≥1 to be determined) and let a j def = − 1 u · G j (u) > 0, we infer from Figure 2(a) :
for any value v ≥ u, with all the equalities holding when v = u. Given these, we also have −a j · u = ln 1 − F j (u) ≤ ln 1 − n j=1 F j (u) = ln 1 − F 1 (u) ,
for each j ∈ [n]. Put everything together: for any value v ≥ u,
It can be seen that this lower-bound formula is an increasing function in the term F 1 (u) ∈ [0, 1].
We would like to choose k ← ⌊e/∆⌋. Because the step-size ∆ ≤ 1, we do have k ∈ N ≥1 and u = k · ∆ ∈ [e − 1, e]. Then, it follows from Fact 8 that F 1 (u) ≥ F 1 (e − 1) ≥ 1 − 1 e−1 . Replace the term F 1 (u) in the above lower-bound formula with this bound: for any value v ∈ [u, ∞),
≥ 1 − ln( e−1 e−2 ) · (e − 1) 1−v/e (as u ≤ e) = 1 − (e − 1) · ln( e−1 e−2 ) · e − ln(e−1) e ·v ≥ 1 − 3 2 · e −v/6 .
(elementary calculations)
Of course, this inequality holds in the shorter range of v ∈ [e, ∞). Instead, when F ≡ {F j } n j=1 is a continuous MHR instance, by definition (see Section 2.1) each function G j (v) = ln 1 − F j (v) itself is a concave function (as Figure 2(b) illustrates). That is, we can simply choose u ← e and apply the same arguments as the above. Actually, we can get a better lower-bound formula that F 1 (v) ≥ 1 − 5 4 · e −v/e for any value v ≥ e. Clearly, Item 2 is an implication of Item 1 and Lemma 6. Now, we turn to attesting Item 3. By definition, the function S F (x) = min 1, x + 8β · x · (1 − x) + 7β = 1 when x ≥ 1 − 7β. Hence, the shaded instance F ≡ F 1 ⊎ F 2 has a support supremum of
≤ 6 ln( 2805 7ε 2 ) ≤ 12 ln(21/ε).
(Fact 4.4: β ≤ ε 2 1870 ) This completes the proof of Lemma 9.
Revenue Loss. Conceivably, the original instance F ≡ F 1 ⊎ F 2 should have a relatively small optimal reserve r F , since F 1 and F 2 both have light tails. This proposition is formalized as the next Lemma 10, which will be useful in our later proof.
Lemma 10. For the original MHR instance F = F 1 ⊎F 2 , there is an optimal Anonymous Reserve auction having a reserve of r F ≤ C * , where the constant C * ≈ 20.5782 is the larger one between the two roots of the transcendental equation 3 2 · z · e −z/6 = 1.
Proof of Lemma 10. The proof here is similar in spirit to that of Fact 6. When there are multiple alternative optimal reserves r F 's, we would select the smallest one. To see the lemma, we need the math fact 3 2 · z · e −z/6 < 1 when z > C * ≈ 20.5782. Then, it follows from Lemma 9.1 that r · 1 − F 1 (r) ≤ 3 2 · r · e −r/6 < 1,
for any reserve r > C * . Particularly, lim r→∞ r · 1 − F 1 (r) = 0. By contrast, we have scaled the instance such that max v∈R ≥0 v · 1 − F 1 (v) = 1, which means r · 1 − F 1 (r) = 1 for some other reserve r ∈ [0, C * ]. Recall the Anonymous Reserve revenue formula:
That is, under our tie-breaking rule, any reserve r > C * cannot be revenue-optimal. Apparently, this observation indicates Lemma 10.
Below, Lemma 11 finally establishes the desired revenue gap between the original instance F ≡ F 1 ⊎ F 2 and its shaded counterpart F ≡ F 1 ⊎ F 2 , thus settling the MHR case.
Lemma 11. When the sample complexity m ≥ 5610ε −2 · (ln ε −1 + ln δ −1 + 5):
Proof of Lemma 11. Recall that the function S
Based on the support supremum s u ≤ 12 ln( 21 ε ) established in Lemma 9.3 and the Anonymous Reserve revenue formula, we deduce that 12 AR(F) − AR( F ) ≤ AR(r F , F) − AR(r F , F) (r F may not be optimal for F)
[First Term]. Recall Fact 8 that the highest CDF F 1 (v) ≥ 1 − 1 v for any value v ∈ R ≥0 . Further, of course F 1 (v) ≤ 1. Given these and because r F ≤ C * ≈ 20.5782 (see Lemma 10), we have
[Second Term]. Clearly, F 2 (v) ∈ [0, 1] for all value v ∈ R ≥0 . Also, we infer from Lemma 9.2 that 1 − F 2 (v) ≤ 3 2 · e −v/6 when v ≥ e. For these reasons, 
Continuous λ-Regular Setting
In the literature, there is another distribution family that receives much attention [CN91, CR14, CR17, AB19] -the continuous λ-regular distributions. When the built-in parameter λ ranges from 0 to 1, this family smoothly expands from the MHR family to the regular family.
A la the MHR case, the sample complexity upper bound is still O ε −2 · (ln ε −1 + ln δ −1 ) , despite that the O(·) notation now hides some absolute constant C λ depending on λ ∈ (0, 1). Since the proof of this bound is very similar to the MHR case, we just show in Appendix B a counterpart extreme value theorem (cf. Lemma 9), but omit the other parts about the revenue smoothness analysis.
It is noteworthy that the O ε −2 upper bound may not be optimal. Namely, in both of the continuous λ-regular setting and the continuous MHR setting, the best known lower bounds are Ω(ε −3/2 ) [HMR18] . It would be interesting to pin down the exact sample complexity in both settings, for which the tools developed here and in [CD15, HMR18, GHZ19] might be useful.
Conclusion and Open Problems
In this work, we proved the almost tight sample complexity of the Anonymous Reserve auction, for each of the [0, 1] n -support, [0, 1] n -support, regular and MHR distribution families. In the literature on "mechanism design via sampling", a notion complementary to sample complexity is regret minimization (e.g., cf. [BHW02, BKRW03, BH05] and the follow-up papers). Respecting the Anonymous Reserve auction, this means the seller must select a careful reserve price r t ∈ R ≥0 in each round t over a time horizon T ∈ N ≥1 , in order to maximize the cumulative revenue, i.e. minimize the cumulative revenue loss against a certain benchmark.
Indeed, if the seller can access the highest and second-highest bids in all of the past (t − 1) rounds, our results imply the nearly optimal regret bounds. Consider the [0, 1]-additive setting for example. Because O(ε −2 · ln ε −1 ) samples suffice to reduce the revenue loss to ε ∈ (0, 1), the regret in each round t ∈ [T] is at most O( (ln t)/t). As a result, the cumulative regret is at most T Additionally, another natural and meaningful adjusted model is to assume that the bidders would strategically report their samples, or further, that the bidders themselves are learners as well. At the time of our paper, this research direction is very nascent yet has already received much attention. For an overview of this, the reader can turn to [BDHN17, LHW18, HT19] and the references therein.
A.2 Proof of Lemma 1
Lemma 1 is enabled by Bernstein's inequality [Ber24] , which is given in the following Fact 13.
Fact 13 (Bernstein's Inequality). Given i.i.d. random variables X 1 , X 2 , · · · , X t , · · · , X m such that X t − E[X t ] ≤ M for some constant M ∈ R ≥0 , let X def = 1 m · m t=1 X t , the following holds: With (1 − δ) confidence, for both i ∈ {1, 2}, the following holds for the i-th highest CDF F i and its empirical counterpart E i : for any value v ∈ R ≥0 ,
≤ v m an re-ordering of the i-th highest sample s i ≡ ( s t, i ) t∈ [m] . Based on these, we can partition all the non-negative values v ∈ R ≥0 into (m + 1) segments 14 , namely [v t , v t+1 ) for all t ∈ [0 : m]. Of course, every partition value v = v t (that t / ∈ {0, m + 1}) presents exactly one sample entry s t, i , at which the empirical i-th highest CDF E i has a probability mass of 1 m . Thus, for any segment [v t , v t+1 ) and any value v ∈ R ≥0 belonging to it, we have
where the last inequality holds whenever the sample complexity m ≥ 3 ≥ e 3 8 ≥ e 3 8 · δ. Actually, for every partition value v = v t that t ∈ [0 : m + 1], we can establish a stronger concentration inequality: let a def = F i (v) · 1 − F i (v) and b def = √ 2β · a + 2β 3 , then
To see so, let us probe the i.i.d. Bernoulli random variable X t def = ½ s t, i ≤ v for each t ∈ [m].
One can easily check that 1 m · m t=1 X t = E i (v) and E[X t ] = F i (v). Hence, we invoke Bernstein's inequality, with the parameters σ = m · b, Var[X t ] = a 2 and M = 1:
[When E i = 1]. It follows that F i + 2β · F i · (1 − F i ) + β (14) ≥ 1 and thus F i = S F (F i ) = min 1, F i + 8β · F i · (1 − F i ) + 7β ≥ min 1, F i + 2β · F i · (1 − F i ) + β = 1 ≥ E i .
[When E i < 1]. It follows that E i (14) = F i + 2β · F i · (1 − F i ) + β and thus
Combining everything together leads to
Namely, E i = min{1, LHS of (16)} ≤ min{1, RHS of (16)} = F i . We thus conclude Item 2.
B Continuous λ-Regular Setting
This appendix sketches out how to establish the O ε −2 · (ln ε −1 + ln δ −1 ) sample complexity upper bound of Algorithm 1 in the λ-regular setting. By standard notion, for a certain 0 < λ < 1, a continuous distribution F j is λ-regular when H j (v) def = 1 − F j (v) −λ is a convex function on its support v ∈ supp(F j ). Similar to the regular case and the MHR case, we assume the distributions F ≡ {F j } n j=1 to be independent, and scale the instance so that max v∈R ≥0 v · 1 − F 1 (v) = 1. Thus, Lemma 6 and Facts 7 to 9 still holds. From the λ-regularity, we can derive the next Lemma 12.
Lemma 12. The following holds for any continuous λ-regular instance F ≡ {F j } n j=1 : given any value u > 1, the highest CDF F 1 (v) ≥ 1 − ( u v ) 1/λ · ln( u u−1 ) for any larger value v ≥ u.
That is, the highest CDF F 1 must have a superlinearly-decay tail ( u v ) 1/λ · ln( u u−1 ) = O(v −1/λ ). Although heavier than the exponentially-decay tail in the MHR case, this still suffices to prove a sample complexity upper bound of O C λ · ε −2 · (ln ε −1 + ln δ −1 ) , where C λ is some absolute constant given by λ ∈ (0, 1).
To achieve so, we shall select a careful anchoring point u > 1 in Lemma 12 and adopt the almost same arguments as in the MHR case (recall Lemmas 9 to 11). When λ → 1, the built-in constant C λ can be arbitrarily large -since the λ-regular family finally expands to the regular family, Theorem 1.3 declares a truly greater sample complexity of Θ(ε −3 ).
Proof of Lemma 12. We first apply a reduction to the distributions F ≡ {F j } n j=1 such that, compared to the original highest CDF F 1 , the resulting highest CDF decreases point-wise for any value v ≥ u. The reduction is illustrated in the following Figure 3 . Since H j (v) = 1 − F j (v) −λ is a convex function, define b j def = 1 u · H j (u) > 0, then for any value v ≥ u, with all the equalities hold when v = u. For these reasons, we have
After being rearranged, this inequality becomes
where the last inequality is because e −z ≥ 1 − z. This completes the proof of Lemma 12.
